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1. INTRODUCTION 
Due to the assumptions of market failures and the under-investment in R&D and innovation 
activities, all OECD countries are spending significant amounts of public funds on 
programmes intended to stimulate these activities. At the end of the 1990s, the share of 
government funding of the total R&D, in the respective economies, was approximately one 
third in the US and Europe and one fifth in Japan (OECD 2000). Nearly 10% of commercial 
firms’ R&D expenditures in the OECD are publicly funded. 
The theoretical literature on the economic benefits of innovative activities is vast. There is 
also a steadily growing empirical econometric literature and case studies verifying the 
importance of R&D and innovation at various levels of aggregation. Furthermore, it is widely 
accepted that, in the absence of policy intervention, the social rate of return on R&D 
expenditure exceeds the private rate, leading to a socially sub-optimal rate of investment in 
R&D (Guellec and Pottlesberge, 1997). The main channels of public support for individual 
firms are tax incentives, direct government funding, co-operation arrangements between 
firms, research institutes and universities, and loan guarantees.   
Considerable effort has been devoted to the evaluation of the efficiency of public subsidies 
for R&D. Despite the prevalence of such programmes, there is little consensus about their 
effectiveness (Jaffe 2002 and Hall 2002), and there remain serious methodological issues 
about their findings, which are yet to be investigated.  
Klette, Möen and Griliches (2000) report that most evaluation studies on governmental 
subsidies utilising microeconometric methods are based on the assumption that R&D 
subsidies, to a large extent, are allocated randomly to firms and projects. If the allocation 
process is haphazard  then the challenging issue is to find sufficient comparative data for 
firms receiving R&D subsidies as for similar non-supported firms. The difference in 
performance between the two groups of firms could then be estimated, with public funds as a 
determinant. 
There is overwhelming evidence that firms do not randomly participate in governmental 
R&D support programs. On the contrary many studies have concluded that, to a large extent, 
public R&D policy attempts to cherry-pick the winners in programs such as ATP, 
SEMATECH and SBIR (see Irwin and Klenow, 1996 and Lerner, 1998). Furthermore, small 
firms participate less frequently than larger firms in various support programmes and a larger  
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proportion of beneficiaries and users of the support programs are in the more technologically 
advanced sectors (Hanel, 2003). 
If the performance of the supported and non-supported firms ex ante differs systematically 
one difficulty in this type of evaluation is the potential selection bias. Jaffe (2002) describes a 
typical case, where firms funded by the government are liable to be those with the best ideas. 
This implies that these firms have more incentive to spend their own resources and are more 
likely to receive support from third parties. Hence, in a microeconometric analysis, public 
funding is an endogenous variable and its inclusion in the list of independent variables will 
result in inconsistencies.  
The empirical analysis in this paper seeks to assess to what extent firms receiving subsidy 
would have invested had they not benefited from apublic policy scheme? In doing so we 
investigate whether firms that received public funds, have on the average, a higher R&D 
intensity compared to those that did not receive any public support.   
In order to account for selectivity bias we initially estimate a firm’s probability of receiving 
public funds given a number of observable characteristics. The sample is then divided  with 
respect to a firm's participation in the public R&D schemes and a potential control group of 
non-subsidised firms. Each subsidised firm is matched with a similar non-subsidised firm, or 
a pair of similar firms, that have the same probability of being subsidised, and the difference 
in their performances is computed. The difference is then linked to the effects of subsidy on 
the performance of firms.  
The remaining part of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews the theoretical 
background with a focus on recent studies evaluating the effects of government sponsored 
commercial R&D programmes. Section 3 delineates the data. Section 4 introduces the 
methodological approach used. Section 5 states the empirical results, and Section 6 concludes 
this study. 
  
2. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND REVIEW OF RECENT STUDIES 
The economic-theoretic support for state intervention in R&D activities begins with 
Schumpeter (1942), Nelson (1959) and Arrow (1962) and revolves around the conceptual 
idea that knowledge is a nonrival good. Therefore, the return on investment cannot be 
appropriated by the firm undertaking the investment, thus leading to an underprovision of 
R&D investment in the economy. To correct for this market failure and in an attempt to  
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estimate the optimum level of public support for commercial firms, Gullec and Pottelsberghe 
(2003) suggest a threshold value of approximately 10%, on average, for the 17 OECD 
countries. Interestingly, this only slightly exceeds the reported average rate of subsidy for the 
OECD as a whole. 
In their endogenous growth model Davidsson and Segerstrom (1998) differentiate between 
innovative R&D and imitative R&D. The former produces higher quality products, while the 
latter imitates other firms’ products. Although both types of R&D activities create new 
knowledge, they find that only innovative R&D subsidies lead to faster economic growth. A 
governmental grant regime, stimulating a faster rate of imitation, makes the monopoly profits 
earned from successful innovation more short-lived. The consequence is a decrease in the rate 
of technical change, resulting in  slower economic growth. Based on data from a typical 
OECD country, Davidsson and Segerstrom empirically show that all R&D expenditures 
increase the level of GDP, but only investments associated with new products for the market, 
new processes and development of knowledge have a positive impact on the GDP growth 
rate.  
Most industrialised countries have publicly funded research-grant programmes that attempt to 
funnel public resources directly into R&D projects that are anticipated to have particularly 
large social benefits. Such research-grant programmes include those that support basic 
scientific research; R&D aimed at particular technical priorities to the state (e.g. defence, 
health and environment); “pre-competitive” R&D intended to generate large spill-over, often 
with a collaborative component; subsidies especially targeting the new technology based 
firms and early-stage financing to firms, particularly those in the high-technology field. Most 
of these grant programmes can be assumed to target innovative R&D along the Davidsson-
Segerstrom definition. 
The assessment of various governmental grant programmes is afflicted with fundamental 
measurement problems such as: (i) how to measure research output of supported research 
entities, (ii) how to measure the spill-over benefits of funded research enjoyed by entities 
other than those that are directly supported, and (iii) how to measure transformational 
impacts, whereby public support changes the nature of the research infrastructure, with 
possible long-lasting effects.  
In evaluation studies several different measures of R&D output can be distinguished. First, if 
the R&D expenditure is aimed at early-stage technology development then the output can be  
  5
technical and the activities that transform commercially promising innovation into a business 
plan  can attract sufficient investment such that output enters a market successfully (see 
Branscomb et. al 1999). Second, when the objective of the R&D efforts is to develop a new 
science or technology that is protectable, then the best measure of output is patents or 
copyrights. Third, R&D investment intended to result in the successful entry of a new or 
significantly improved product into a particular market can best be measured as innovation 
sales.  
A more recent discussion on the impact of state funding considers whether the public funding 
decision represents an endorsement of a project as being of high quality. The screening of 
proposals by the likelihood of success is a costly and uncertain process. Non-public sources 
of funding may piggyback on the public review process, or, even if they make their own 
assessments, they acknowledge that their assessment is uncertain and can be influenced by 
that of the government experts. This “certification” or “halo” effect is believed by research 
grants agencies in the USA to be an important factor in increasing the total spending of grant 
recipients (Diamond 1998, and Jaffe 2002).  
It is also well documented in the literature that firms funded by the government are likely to 
be among those with the best ideas. Thus, they have more incentive to spend their own 
resources, and are more likely to receive support from third parties than firms not funded. As 
emphasised by Jaffe (2002), any regression analysis that compares the research expenditure 
of government supported firms to those that are not supported has to take into account the 
selectivity problem. A closely related assessment issue concerns additivity versus crowding 
out phenomenon. While the selectivity problem arises because public funding goes to 
proposals judged in advance as likely to succeed; the additivity and crowding phenomenon 
out refers as to whether public funding increases the total spending on research or merely 
displaces funding from other sources.
1  
In order to measure the impact of public funded R&D and to reduce the problem of selection 
bias, many recent assessment studies rely on one or more of the following methods: (i) 
regressions with controls, (ii) fixed effects or difference-in-difference models, (iii) sample 
selection models, (iv) instrument variable estimators, or (v) matched samples of treated and 
untreated firms. The treated firms are firms receiving public funds. 
                                                 
1 Busom (2000) discusses the problem of complete crowding out versus partial crowding out and concludes that 
the latter often is difficult to measure due to lack of detailed information about the firms’ R&D expenditures. 
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In recent years there has been a surge in econometric works focusing on the effectiveness of 
public R&D policy at various levels of aggregation in many OECD countries.
2 This paper 
adds to the sub-branch of public R&D policy assessment, which focuses on the evaluation of 
the impact of governmental support on private research expenditures. Table 1 depicts the 
common methods used and the main results from selected recent related studies.  
Table 1:  Recent studies on the impact of R&D subsidies.  
Year Data  and 
period 
Author(s) Methods  Results 






R&D subsidies have no effect of private R&D for 
large firms but increase private funding by 5% for 
small firms. 




For two firms out of three the subsidies increase 
private funding of R&D by 20%. For the 
remaining third of firms, there would be a 
complete crowding out. 






The R&D investment would have been made even 
without subsidies because governmental agencies 
tend to favor projects with the highest private 
return. 






Using matching methods and a subsidy dummy 
variable suggest that subsidies add to private 
funding of R&D. Regression methods suggest that 
one additional dollar in R&D subsidy would 
increase private R&D by 41 cents. 






On the average one Euro of subsidy would 
increase private R&D by 1.3 to 1.4 Euros. 








Firms in Eastern Germany that participated in 
governmental R&D schemes increased the private 
R&D-investments with an amount corresponding 
to 4% of their turnover. 




R&D subsidies add to the private R&D. 
 
The studies based on Israeli longitudinal data (Lach, 2000), German longitudinal and cross-
sectional data (Czarnitzki and Fier, 2001, and Almus and Czarnitzki, 2003) and French 
longitudinal data (Duguet 2003) use both regressions with controls and matched samples. All 
these studies suggest that public funds stimulate private R&D activities. A Finnish 
longitudinal study (Toivanen and Niinen, 2000) and one Spanish cross sectional study 
(Busom 2000), both using regressions with controls, gave mixed results. Finally, Wallsten 
(2000) finds that public support within the framework of the U.S. SBIR-programme, does not 
increase private spending. 
                                                 
2 For examples of such studies, see Klette and Möen (Norway), 1999; Lerner (USA), 1999; Guellec and 
Pottelsberghe (OECD), 1999; Czarnitzki (2000) Germany; Branstter and Sakakibara (2000) Japan; Hyytinen and 
Toivanen (Finland), 2003; Duguet (France), 2003; Almus and Czarnitzki (Germany), 2003; Motohashi  (Japan),  
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The heterogeneous results from different assessment studies, shown in Table 1, confirm 
previous findings in the literature. Reviewing the body of available econometric evidence 
accumulated over the past 35 years, David, Hall and Toole (1999) conclude that conflicting 
answers are given as to whether public R&D spending increases or replaces private R&D 
expenditure.  The authors suggest that a possible explanation to this ambivalent finding in the 
existing literature would be different and sometimes inadequate research methodologies 
applied to the data.  
The methodology used in this paper, motivated by the data available, is a matching process, 
whereby subsidised firms are matched with the most similar but non-subsidized firms found 
in the sample. Our approach of matching samples is similar to the Rosenbaum and Rubin 
(1983) propensity score model. In this approach a group of firms that have the same 
probability of receiving public funds is considered as reference group. Each subsidized firm 
is matched with a non-subsidized firm that has the same characteristics and probability of 
being subsidized and the difference in their R&D performances is computed. This procedure 
is repeated for all the subsidized firms and the average of these differences will provide an 
estimator of the possible effect of public R&D support on the firms’ R&D activities. 
 
3. THE DATA  
The data used in this study is obtained from the Community Innovation Survey (CIS) III for 
Sweden. The survey was collected in 2001 and it covers the period 1998 to 2000. The focus 
is on both the manufacturing sector and business services. The sample is restricted to only 
firms that reported a positive R&D and other innovation expenditure. The final sample 
consists of 770 firms of which 160 (20.8%) firms participated in public R&D schemes. The 
CIS data was merged with register data containing complete information on the firms’ annual 
accounts. 
Table 2 shows that the proportion of subsidised R&D-firms varies within the range of 8-30 % 
in each different industry class. The largest fraction of supported firms is found among 
recycling, business services, motor vehicles and food products.  Publishing and raw material 
based production show the lowest proportion of firms utilizing governmental R&D 
programmes. 
                                                                                                                                                        
(2003), and Hanel (Canada) 2003). For recent surveys, see also Kette, Möen and Griliches (2000) and Hall and 
Van Reenen (2000).  
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Comparing different size classes, Table 3 reveals that the proportion of supported R&D firms 
is considerably smaller for medium-sized firms (50-499 employees) compared to the group of 
very small firms (10-49). In the largest size group (500 and more) one in four firms 
participated in public R&D programmes. 
Descriptive statistics for the two sub-samples of non-funded and funded firms are presented 
in Table 4. The right section of the table presents results from a t-test on inequality of means 
between the two samples. 
First, it shows that there is a large difference in R&D and other innovation expenditure, per 
employee, between the two samples. The t-test reveals that the average funded firm is 
significantly more R&D-intensive than the average non-funded firm.  Second, Table 4 depicts 
that funded firms have considerably larger gross investment per employee compared to the 
non-funded firms. Third, the average funded firm has a large amount of equity capital, per 
employee, compared to its non-funded counterpart. Fourth, we also observe that a funded 
firm is on the average somewhat larger than the non-funded counterpart. The funded firm 
also has a relatively high degree of indebtedness per employee. However, the size based 
mean-values are not statistically different. 
The lower section of Table 4 presents descriptive statistics for the 7 dummy variables, based 
on the CIS-survey.  Here we find that one in four funded firms reported that financial 
constraints hampered their innovation activities compared to only one in ten non-funded 
firms. Our interpretation is that funded firms belong to a select group of firms with more 
ideas than non-funded firms. Non-funded firms have a greater propensity to be part of a 
group and to be foreign owned.  For other variables, including demand pull R&D (a 
composite variable indicating if the intention of R&D is to extend the range of products, to 
increase market share or improve product quality), lack of skill as an obstacle to innovation, 
possession of patents or an export indicator; no significant difference can be established 
between the two samples.   
In summation, our findings suggest that the group of funded firms is a selective one. The 
descriptive statistics show large differences between the two groups regarding firms’ 
investment in R&D and physical capital, but also with respect to external financial sources in 
terms of equity and debt. It is to be noted that by not accounting for such systematic 
differences listed above, when assessing the efficiency of public R&D support to firms, will 
very likely result in selectivity bias.   
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4. THE METHODOLOGY  
The fundamental research issue is to measure the effect of public R&D support on firms’ 
innovation performances. A methodological challenge as defined in the statistics literature as 
the lack of counterfactual evidence, implies that we cannot forecast the result of the firms’ 
innovation performances in the absence of subsidies.
3 Pursuing the literature on assessing the 
effect of a particular treatmentf, we will use the results of non-recipients, with similar 
characteristics, to estimate the possible effect on recipients had they not participated in public 
funded R&D-programmes. The first disparity in this literature lies in the use of experimental 
and non-experimental methods. In a non-experimental evaluation, as pointed out by Smith 
(2000); “statistical techniques are used to adjust the results of persons who choose to 
participate, in order to  assess the result had  they not participated. In contrast, an 
experimental method directly produces counterfactual evidence by forcing some potential 
participants not to participate.”  
The present study compares data on non-experimental groups of firms. The estimator we 
apply is a semi-parametric method of matching. More conventional methods in causality 
studies use parametric estimators, such as instrumental variable estimators; the two-step 
estimator of Heckman (1979) or the difference-in-difference estimator. The choice of a 
particular estimator is often motivated by the structure of the data available together with the 
research question. 
Heckman et al. (1998) notes that pioneering matching studies were made by Fecher (1860). 
Traditional matching estimators pair each collaborator with an observable similar non-
collaborator, and interpret the difference in their outcomes as the effect of collaboration. 
However, when the sample contains extensive control variables (X), it is difficult to 
determine which variables (or more correctly cells) to match with a unit. Moreover, for some 
values of (X) among participants, close matches will perhaps not be found among comparison 
members. A solution to this problem, based on statistical tests, is the “propensity score” 
matching, developed by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983).
4  
Propensity score matching, rather than utilising a vector of observed characteristics (X), 
matches participants and non-participants based on their estimated probability of 
                                                 
3 For a detailed discussion on the problem with counterfactual evidence in assessment analyses, see Holland 
1986. 
4  Smith (2002) notices that this problem is reduced, but not eliminated when matching on a scalar P(X) 
compared to a vector X.  
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participation; known as P(X).  Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) show that matching on (X)  
produces consistent estimates, matching on P(X) also has the same effect. The propensity 
score matching estimation methods have become increasingly popular in medical trials and in 
the evaluation of economic policy interventions (Becker and Ichino, 2003). Many examples 
of the latter are found in the labour literature. 
Several crucial conditions apply to the use of matching estimators.
5 Matching, whether on X 
or on P(X), relies on a conditional independence assumption. As emphasised by Smith 
(2002); making this conditional independence assumption plausible in practice requires 
access to very rich data. It also requires careful thought, guided by economic theory, about 
which variables do or do not affect participation and outcomes.
6 In addition, Smith and Tood 
(2004) suggest that evaluation estimators are only found to work  effectively when they 
satisfy the following criteria: (a) in a particular treatment program the same data sources are 
used for all participants, and non-participants, (b) the data contains a rich set of variables 
relevant to modelling the participating decision, and (c) participants and non-participants 
reside in the same market.  
In the present study, the conditional independence assumption states that once we condition 
on P(X), participation in public R&D programmes is independent of the outcome in the non-
participation state. This requires that all the variables that affect the outcome, both in 
collaboration  and in the absence of collaboration must be included in the matching. 
However, in our study, in common with most other evaluation analysis, no robust theoretical 
guidance exists as to how to choose the set of conditioning X-variables. 
Although the assessment estimators discussed by Smith and Todd (2004) concern labour-
market programs, we assume that the criteria can be transposed to other markets.  Thus, we 
conclude that the Community Innovation Survey information fulfils criterion (a) and at least 
partly, criterion (c)
7. In addition we find support for criterion(b) in Almus and Czarnitzki 
(2003), who argue that the CIS-data provides comprehensive information on the firms for 
identifying a similar control observation for each treated firm. However, in the present study 
                                                 
5 Heckman, Ichimura and Todd (1997, 1998), Heckman, Ichimura, Smith and Todd (1998), Smith and Todd 
(2004), and Smith (2000), provide critical discussions on strengths and weakness of matching estimators. 
6 Partly at variance with Deheija and Wahba (1999), Heckman, et al. (1998), Heckman, Ichimura and Todd 
(1999), Lechner (2002) and Smith and Todd (2004) find that the matching estimates can be quite sensitive to the 
variables needed to construct P(X). 
7 This is applicable at the 2-digit level of industry classification.  
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we have supplemented the CIS data with financial information, from the annual accounts, on 
physical capital stock, equity and debt. 
The matching estimation procedure we are using can be described as follows. Initially a 
probit model is applied in order to estimate the propensity score for each observation. The 
dependent variable is the decision whether, or not, to participate in public R&D programs. 
The vector of  determinant variables  contains the set of characteristics (13 explanatory 
variables and 15 dummies for industry classifications) that potentially influence the 
probability of receiving public R&D support. After the determinants to R&D subsidy are 
identified and the probit model is estimated, a mono-dimensional propensity score is 
calculated for every observation. This measure is used to find counterfactuals for each 
supported firm.  
In the next step we conduct a non-parametric matching approach based on the propensity 
score. Here the procedure is as follows. Firstly, the observations are separated with respect to 
their status regarding public R&D support. Secondly, a firm i that receives subsidy is 
selected. Thirdly, we utilize the propensity score and calculate a correct measure of distance 
to find the nearest neighbors or matched firms for each subsidized firm. The matching 
procedure is regarded as successful if the means of the probability of receiving R&D support 
and the means of determinants of receipt of subsidy, among the two groups, do not differ 
significantly. Finally, the impact of public financial support in promoting innovation is 
evaluated by comparing the average R&D expenditures between the groups of subsidized and 
non-subsidized firms. 
We now proceed to the more formal notation of the estimation approach applied in this study. 
Following Heckman, Ichimura, Smith and Todd (1998)
8, we denote  the outcome conditional 
on R&D support by Y1 and the outcome on non-support by Y0. Further, let U=1 to signify 
participation in public R&D schemes, otherwise U=0. Since we only observe Y0 or Y1 for 
each firm, but never both, without statistical techniques we cannot compute the causal effect 
of R&D-subsidies, ∆ =Y1-Y0, for any firm. 
The method of matching applied is aimed at identifying non-subsidized firms, with the same 
probability of receiving support, as those actually subsidized. That is, conditional on some X, 
Y0 is independent of U: 
                                                 
8 See also Fisher (1935), Roy (1951) and Quandt (1972)  
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  Y 0 ⊥U  |  X     (1)   
where “⊥” denotes independence and the variables to the right of “|” are conditioning 
variables. This assumption generates a control group with the following characteristics: 
conditional on X, the distribution of Y0, given U=1, is the same as the distribution of Y0, 
given U = 0. Hence, considering mean value, the implication of (1) is: 
  E(Y0| X, U=1) = E(Y0|X, U=0)    (2) 
Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) prove that given that the Y0 results are independent of 
collaboration participation, conditional on X, they are also independent of participation, 
conditional on the propensity score Pr(U=1|X). An important implication is as follows: 
provided that we can apply a probit model and parametrically estimate the conditional 
probability of participating in a joint research program, the multi-dimensionality of the 
matching problem is reduced by matching on a mono-dimensional (scalar) propensity score. 
Thus the formal notion for the applied probit model is:  
  Pr{Ui=1 | Xi} = F(h(Xi))     (3) 
where F(.) is the normal or logistic cumulative distribution, and h(Xi) is a function of 
covariates with linear and higher terms.  
Traditional propensity score matching methods pair each participant with a single non- 
participant (a “twin”). Nearest neighbours may be far apart. For that reason a metric criterion 
can be imposed to ensure that the match is close enough:  
  C(Xi) = 
j min |Xi-Xj|, i ∈ {U=1} j ∈ {U=0}  (4) 
Smith (2000) points out that nearest neighbour matching can be operationalised with more 
than one nearest neighbour, and with or without replacement; where “with replacement” 
means that a given non-participant observation can form the counterfactual for more than one 
participant. In this paper we use the two nearest neighbours. The main advantage of a larger 
number of neighbours, compared to pairwise matching, is a reduction in the variance of the 
estimators (Smith and Todd, 2004). Moreover, this method ignores observations with 
insufficient close neighbours. In the present study, we have utilised both the nearest 
neighbour (kernel) approach and an extension of this approach that includes two neighbours.  
  13
In the latter case, 4 per cent (or 6) of the subsidized firms lacking close neighbours are 
excluded from the matching procedure.   
A successful matching process is defined to a large extent by overlapping of the propensity 
scores for collaborators and non-collaborators. Figure 1, in the appendix, displays the 
estimated propensity scores for the subsidized firms (“treatment group”) and non-subsidized 
firms (“potential control group”). In particular, the left part of Figure 1 shows a considerable 
divergence between the two samples.  Figure 2 presents the propensity scores for subsidized 
firms and the selected control group of nearest neighbours. In this case it is shown that the 
overlap between the treatment group and the control group is almost complete.  
The average of the difference in R&D-intensity between subsidized firms and the control 
group of non-subsidized twin firms will provide an unbiased estimator of the importance of 
the governmental R&D-policy. Formally this can be expressed as: 


















θ , i ∈ {U=1}, j ∈ {U=0}  (5) 
5. THE MATCHING RESULTS 
In the first step of our assessment we investigate factors that influence the probability of 
receiving public R&D support. Table 5 displays the probit estimation results based on data 
from a sample of 770 innovative firms. The following determinants are found to have 
significant influence on the firms’ receipt of public R&D funds.   
Firstly, the probability of receiving public funds decreases with the firms’ size. The small 
positive sign on the squared size variable reinforces, at a decreasing rate, the disadvantage of 
large firms in the allocation of public funds.  
Secondly, it is likely that firms reporting lack of appropriate sources of finance as a 
hampering factor for innovation activities, more often receive subsidies than other firms. One 
explanation may be that highly innovative firms have more ideas than investment funds 
available to them.  
Thirdly, for the Swedish sample of R&D-firms in this paper, membership of a group of firms 
has a negative influence on public R&D support.. This is interpreted as, membership of a 
group is an indication of the availability of alternative sufficient non-public pool of financial 
or R&D resources.   
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Fourthly, we find some fragile evidence that the amount of debt per employee is positively 
associated with R&D activities.  Since debt is a positive function of profitability, this estimate 
indicates that successful firms with access to both internal and external financial resources 
have a greater probability of receiving public financial support.  
Finally, possession of patents, as a proxy for recurrent R&D activities, and a firms current 
R&D-stock, have a positive impact on the receipt of R&D support at the 10% level of 
significance.  A large R&D-stock is an indication of effective and successful use of research 
and development resources. 
The non-parametric estimation results by matching are presented in Table 6. The left section 
of the table displays the results from the kernel matching and the right section depicts the 
nearest neighbour matching (NNM) estimates. Here we examine the effect of public grants on 
the R&D intensity, and indirectly, the subsidies’ possible negative allocative distortions on 
productive resources. Given that public resources are raised via socially costly revenue 
mechanisms, then society will be worse off if the total R&D investment remains unchanged 
but public funded investment replaces privately funded investment (see Jaffe 2002). 
The first column of both the left and the right hand sections of Table 6 display the mean 
values for the selected control group of counterfactual. The second column of each part 
shows the mean values for the subsidized firms. It should be noted, that the counterfactual 
group in the Kernel matching consists of one matched firm to each subsidized firm, while the 
corresponding group in the NNM-approach consists of two matched firms to each subsidized 
firm. The estimate of the target variable, R&D per employee, in the case of the non-
subsidized firms represents the effect on the subsidized firms had they not received any 
support. 
The unbiased estimator of the effectiveness of a public innovation policy, aimed at 
stimulating private R&D investment, shows that the average subsidized firm has significantly 
greater R&D expenditure per employee compared to a twin-firm without any public R&D 
support.   
Before any conclusion can be drawn from this study, there remains an important 
methodological issue to be addressed. It concerns the construction of a relevant and valid 
control group (Klette et. al 2000). 
Examining the estimated probability of receiving funding, the results from the Kernel 
matching reveal a difference between the two samples. The two-sample test of inequality,  
  15
though, suggests that the difference is not statistically significant. When utilising the NNM-
approach, we find no evidence of disparity in the likelihood of participating in public R&D 
programmes. 
The results from the Kernel matching show no evidence of disparity in the means, for 25 out 
of the 27 control variables. The exceptions are debt and firm size. Subsidized firms have on 
average a greater ratio of debt per employee than non-subsidized firms and are also somewhat 
larger. The estimate from the NNM-approach, however, reveals no significant differences 
between the subsidized firms and non-subsidized firms in the selected control group 
regarding the 12 variables controlling form different firm characteristics and the 15 industry 
dummies as well.  
In order to make a sensitivity test of the main results, we repeat the semi-parametric 
estimation procedure, but drop the small firms in the sample. These include firms with 10-50 
employees.  Using the Kernel-approach, the left section of Table 7 indicates that the 
productive effect of R&D subsidies is significantly different from zero, i.e. the participation 
in government sponsored R&D-programmes resulted in increased private R&D investment. 
However, looking at the results from the NNM-matching (see the right section of Table 7) we 
find that the impact of public R&D is only  marginally different from zero. Hence, the 
conclusion that can be  drawn from the Swedish data is that the hypothesis on the additive 
impact of R&D support on private research expenditure can be supported only for small sized 
firms. 
 
6. SUMMARY  
Technological change, and the growing significance of R&D investment, are often cited as 
the primary driving force of economic growth; and it is widely accepted that the social rate of 
return on R&D expenditure exceeds the private rate. In the absence of policy intervention, the 
latter may lead to low R&D activity in the society and to a sub-optimal rate of economic 
growth. The industrialized countries have all, to varying degrees, publicly funded R&D-
projects that are believed to have particularly large social benefits. The total amount of public 
R&D-support is considerable. On average, within the OECD nearly 10% of the commercial 
firms’ R&D expenditure are publicly funded..  
An important issue to evaluate is whether public funding increases the total spending on 
research or merely displaces funding from other sources. Given that public resources are  
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raised via socially costly revenue mechanisms, then the total economy will be worse off if 
society’s total R&D investment remains unchanged but public research-grant programmes, 
by crowding out, replace privately funded investment. 
One important methodological challenge in the evaluation of public R&D funding is 
discussed in the statistics literature as the lack of counterfactual evidence. This limitation is 
manifest by the fact that we can have no knowledge of the result on the firms’ R&D-
expenditure in the absence of subsidies. In this paper, in concurrence with the tradition in the 
labour literature, we have used the outcomes on non-subsidized R&D-firms to estimate the 
effect on subsidised firms , had they not participated in public R&D-programmes.  
By applying a semi-parametric matching approach we initially established that subsidised 
firms are a select group of R&D-firms. These firms invest more in both R&D and physical 
capital compared to other R&D-firms; they have relatively more equity-capital; they are 
somewhat larger and more debt-financed. To correct for this potential selectivity bias, 
initially a probit model is applied to estimate the propensity score. The dependent variable is 
the decision whether or not to participate in public R&D programs. As a result a mono-
dimensional propensity score was calculated for every observation, which was used to find 
non-supported counterfactual for each supported firm.  
Next, we conducted a non-parametric matching estimation based on the propensity score. 
These observations were separated with respect to their status of public R&D support. Then, 
firms receiving funds are individually selected and we utilized the propensity score to find the 
nearest neighbors, or matched firms, for every subsidized firm. The matching procedure was 
regarded as successful since the means of the probability  of receiving R&D support and the 
determinants of subsidy, in both groups, did not differ significantly. Finally the impact of 
public financial support on private R&D-investment was evaluated by comparing the average 
R&D-intensity between the groups of subsidized and non-subsidized firms. The results, based 
on a large sample of Swedish firms, showed that the average subsidized firm has significantly 
greater R&D expenditure per employee compared to a twin-firm without public R&D 
support. However, this difference is  relatively insignificant and applicable only for medium 
and large sized firm with more than 50 employees. 
Given the results presented here, the interpretation is as follows. Having used a matching 
process and controlling for the differences between funded and non-funded firms, we find 
that public funds contribute to an increase in the total R&D efforts in Sweden, but the only  
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beneficiaries are small manufacturing and services firms. The results rejected the crowding 
out hypothesis but they did support the hypothesis on the additive effect of public R&D 
support on private research expenditure, among small firms with 10-50 employees. We found 
some variance in the results depending on which alternative unbiased matching estimator is 
employed. Our results based on Community Innovation Survey data merged with register 
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Table 2. Distribution of firms by industrial sector and the percentage of firms subsided. 
Industry 
Code 






Nc14  36-37  Manufacture of furniture; manufacturing n.e.c; 
Recycling 
 
33  30.3 
Nc15  72-73,  
742-743  
Computer and related activities; Research and 
development; Architectural and engineering activities 




             
111  27.9 




Nc1  15-16   Food products and beverages; tobacco   40  27.5 
Nc2  17-19  Textile, apparel and leather  36  22.2 
Nc3  20  Wood and of products of wood and cork, exc. 
furniture; art. of straw and plaiting materials 
34 
20.6 
Nc10  29  Machinery and equipment  79  20.3 
Nc7  25 Rubber  and  plastic  45  20.0 
Nc12  33  Medical, precision and optical instruments  48  18.8 
Nc11  30-32  Office machinery and computers; Electrical machinery 
and apparatus n.e.c.; Radio, television and 
communication equipment and apparatus 
 
             
76  17.1 
Nc9  27-28  Basic metal and fabricated metals; Fabricated metal 
products, except mach. and equipment 
68 
16.2 
Nc6  23-24  Coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel; 
Chemicals and chemical products  
48 
14.6 
Nc4  21  Pulp, paper and paper products  35  14.3 
Nc8  26 Non-metallic  mineral  products  26  13.9 
Nc5  22  Publishing, printing and reproduction of recorded 
media 
 
37  8.1 





 Table 3. Distribution of subsidized firms by size-classes. 
Number of employees  Firm with positive R&D investment  Share of subsidized firms 
10-25 239  23.8 
26-50 127  19.7 
51-100 100  13.0 
101-200 79  20.2 
201-500 125  14.4 
501- 100  31.0  
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Table 4. Summary statistics and result from a two-sample t-test on inequality of means 
between non-funded and funded firms. 
 Non-funded  firms 
Number of observations: 610 
Funded firms 
Number of observations: 160 
 Mean  Std. 
Dev 








a  3.254 1.671 -3.759 7.197 3.941 1.645 -1.385 7.545  -4.68*** 
Firm size
a  4.337 1.461 2.302 8.891 4.446 1.828 2.302 9.753  -0.69 
Gross inv/emp
a  3.719 1.262 -0.753 9.353 4.025 1.294  0  8.290  -2.67*** 
Cap stock/emp
a  4.947 1.384 -0.844 8.417 4.982 1.458 0.356 8.323  -0.27 
Equity/emp
a  5.023 1.560 -0.433 9.299 5.245 1.421 -1.343 8.612  -1.71* 
Debt/emp
a  6.184 0.950 -1.954 9.034 6.318 0.996 3.988 10.127  -1.53 
Financial const.  0.101  0.302  0  1  0.243 0.430  0  1  -3.92*** 
Skill const.  0.150  0.358  0  1  0.143 0.351  0  1  0.22 
Export indicator  0.885  0.318  0  1  0.868 0.338  0  1  0.55 
Foreign  owned  0.249 0.432  0  1  0.181 0.386  0  1  1.92* 
Part of a group  0.675  0.468  0  1  0.525 0.500  0  1  3.42*** 
Recurrent R&D  0.437  0.496  0  1  0.506 0.501  0  1  -1.54 
Demand pull R&D  0.480  0.500  0  1  0.443  0.49  0  1  0.82 
Notes: (a) in logarithmic form.  
Significant at the <1% (***), 1-5% (**) and 5-10% (*) levels of significance.   
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Table 5. Probit parameter estimates of determinants of receipt of public R&D subsidies. 
 Coefficient  t-value 
Number of observations 770    
Firm size (employment)
a -0.536  ***  -2.61 
Firm size squared
 a 0.059  ***  2.99 
Gross inv/emp
a 0.060    1.28 
Cap stock/emp
a -0.050    -0.92 
Equity/emp
a 0.056    1.38 
Debt/emp
a 0.125  *  1.69 
Financial const.  0.572  ***  3.87 
Skill const.  -0.071    -0.46 
Export indicator  -0.081    -0.45 
Foreign owned  -0.108    -0.71 
Part of a group  -0.386  ***  -2.87 
Recurrent R&D  0.237  *  1.82 
Demand pull R&D  -0.089    -0.82 
Notes: Significant at the <1% (***), 1-5% (**) and 5-10% (*) levels of significance.  
Industry dummies are included.  
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 Table 6. Two sample t-tests results of inequality of means after the matching process.  

















Observations  160 160    308 154   
Prob to receive fund  0.269  0.291 -1.21 0.272  0.272 -0.05 
R&D/employee
 a 3.232  0.3941  -4.94***  3.270  3.897  -3.72*** 
Firm size (emp)
a  4.165 4.446  -1.78*  4.211 4.303 -0.56 
Gross inv/emp
a  3.982 4.025  -0.34  4.011 3.985  0.20 
Cap stock/emp
a  4.818 4.982  -1.23  4.734 4.971 -1.58 
Equity/emp
a  5.069 5.245  -1.32  5.175 5.215 -0.28 
Debt/emp
a  6.082 6.318  -2.09**  6.162 6.271 -1.15 
Financial  const.  0.238 0.243  -0.13  0.253 0.240  0.30 
Skill  const.  0.143 0.143  -0.01  0.152 0.142  0.27 
Export  indicator  0.830 0.868  -1.28  0.834 0.863 -0.83 
Foreign  owned  0.173 0.181  -0.25  0.204 0.181  0.58 
Part of a group  0.504  0.525  -0.45  0.519  0.519  0.00 
Recurrent  R&D  0.460 0.506  -1.10  0.496 0.500 -0.06 
Demand pull R&D  0.442  0.443  -0.02  0.422  0.448  -0.52 
Nc2  0.046 0.050  -0.19  0.045 0.051 -0.30 
Nc3  0.049 0.043  0.33  0.035 0.045 -0.48 
Nc4  0.029 0.031  -0.09  0.064 0.032  1.61 
Nc5  0.019 0.018  0.023  0.022 0.019  0.23 
Nc6  0.052 0.043  0.54  0.045 0.045  0.00 
Nc7  0.046 0.056  -0.54  0.042 0.058 -0.73 
Nc8  0.030 0.031  0.03  0.048 0.032  0.86 
Nc9  0.066 0.068  -0.11  0.071 0.071  0.00 
Nc10  0.115 0.100  0.63  0.136 0.103  1.03 
Nc11  0.070 0.081  -0.46  0.058 0.077 -0.76 
Nc12  0.055 0.056  -0.02  0.042 0.058 -0.73 
Nc13  0.074 0.093  -0.83  0.061 0.077 -0.63 
Nc14  0.063 0.062  0.03  0.051 0.064 -0.55 
Nc15  0.175 0.193  -0.56  0.211 0.194  0.41 
Note: Significantly unequal at the <1% (***), 1-5% (**) and 5-10% (*) levels of significance. 
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Table 7. Two sample t-tests results of inequality of means after the matching process. Only 
firms with 51 or more employees are included.  

















Observations  78  78   144  72  
Prob to receive fund  0.272  0.315 -1.42 0.274 0.276 -0.10 
R&D/employee
 a 3.348  3.966  -2.67***  3.413  3.895  -1.97* 
Firm size (emp)
a 5.587  5.990  -1.71*  5.793  5.794  0.00 
Gross inv/emp
a 3.898  4.163  -1.61  4.071  4.129  -0.38 
Cap stock/emp
a 5.240  5.549  -1.53  0.589  0.523  0.37 
Equity/emp
a 5.273  5.551  -1.23  5.453  5.512  -0.27 
Debt/emp
a 6.329  6.766  -2.09**  6.740  6.706  0.24 
Financial const.  0.152  0.205  -0.98  0.194  0.194  0.00 
Skill const.  0.121  0.141  -0.46  0.152  0.138  0.27 
Export indicator  0.904  0.961  -1.69*  0.965  0.958  0.24 
Foreign owned  0.291  0.320  -0.51  0.354  0.333  0.30 
Part of a group  0.719  0.756  -0.65  0.763  0.763  0.00 
Recurrent R&D  0.653  0.730  -1.36  0.618  0.722  -1.55 
Demand pull R&D  0.443  0.461  ´-0.28  0.388  0.472  -1.15 
Note: Significantly unequal at the <1% (***), 1-5% (**) and 5-10% (*) levels of significance.  






Figure 1. Estimated propensity score based on 160 R&D subsidized firms and a potential 




















































Figure 2. Estimated propensity score based on 154 R&D subsidized firms and a selected 
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